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Brazil's Recent Threat on Abbott's
Patent: Resolution or Retaliation?

Jennifer Bjornberg*
I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2005, Brazil threatened to infringe the patent of an anti-AIDS
medication, Kaletra, patented and produced by a U.S. based pharmaceutical
company, Abbott Laboratories. The resulting controversy necessarily
implicated the World Trade Organization's Agreement on Trade Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property ("TRIPS Agreement") as Brazil was a
Member Nation under the agreement and Abbott's product was protected
under that agreement. Ultimately, the threat came to a voluntary resolution
between both parties, but the dispute raised a number of unique questions
relating to international trade and public health concerns.
This article will discuss the recent controversy between Abbott and
Brazil and its resolution in light of the TRIPS Agreement. The article will
also discuss amendments to and interpretations of the TRIPS Agreement.
Part II will describe the background and development of the TRIPS
Agreement as applied to the international pharmaceutical industry,
specifically, pharmaceutical patent protection. This section will also outline
and discuss the relevant articles in the TRIPS Agreement and related
amendments, and will briefly address the current ability of developing
countries to utilize TRIPS Agreement provisions to break pharmaceutical
patents. Part III will delve into the events surrounding and leading up to the
Kaletra controversy with an emphasis on the positions of both Brazil and
Abbott. Part IV will use the TRIPS Agreement provisions discussed in Part
II to support the arguments of both Brazil and Abbott. This section will
also include an analysis of the policy arguments for and against
international pharmaceutical patent protection. Part V will discuss the
resolution of the dispute between Brazil and Abbott and the events
contributing to the agreement between both parties. It will also analyze the
relative position of each party following the resolution, weighing the costs
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and benefits to each. Part V will also explore the larger effects of the
resolution between Brazil and Abbott on the developing world. Finally,
Part VI will briefly conclude on the resulting relationship between the
recent events and the TRIPS Agreement.
II. OVERVIEW OF RELEVANT TRIPS AGREEMENT PROVISIONS
AND AMENDMENTS
A. Background to the Agreement
The system of patent protection established in the World Trade
Organization's ("WTO's") Agreement regarding Trade Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property is modeled after the U.S. patent system.,
Pharmaceutical companies played an important role in the development of
the TRIPS Agreement. Lobbying by the pharmaceutical industry beginning
in the 1980s led to the introduction of intellectual property issues on the
international trade agenda and the eventual adoption by the WTO of the
U.S. model of intellectual property protection.
The U.S. model was
officially adopted with the enactment of the TRIPS Agreement as an annex
of the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the WTO.3
Membership in the WTO is conditioned on compliance with the
TRIPS Agreement.4 For poor and developing nations, WTO membership is
crucial and necessary to any hope of economic growth. Some argue that the
TRIPS Agreement requires all WTO member countries to prematurely
adopt intellectual property standards appropriate for wealthier countries,
"irrespective of their level of development or the social importance of
particular products, or to risk trade sanctions."5 This controversy frames
the present problem, that is, how to balance the property interests of patent
holders with the needs of developing countries, both economically and in
terms of public health. Any interpretation of the TRIPS Agreement and its
application to the dispute between Brazil and Abbott Laboratories
necessarily involves an analysis of these issues.

1 Zita Lazzarini, Making Access to Pharmaceuticals a Reality: Legal Options Under
TRIPS and the Case of Brazil, 6 YALE HUM. RTs. & DEv. L.J. 103, 108 (2003).
2 Id. at 109.

3 id.
4 Peggy V. Sherman & Ellwood F. Oakley III, Pandemics and Panaceas: The World
Trade Organization'sEfforts to Balance PharmaceuticalPatents andAccess to AIDS Drugs,
41 AM. Bus. L.J. 353, 361-62 (2004).
5 Ruth Mayne, The TRIPs Agreement and Access to Medicines: An NGO Perspective, in
THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 146, 154-55 (Homi Katrak & Roger Strange eds.,
2004).

Brazil's Recent Threat on Abbott's Patent

27:199 (2006)
B. Areas of Restriction
The TRIPS Agreement prevents the unauthorized use, production, sale,
import, or distribution of patented products for the duration of the patent
(now a mandatory twenty years) with very specific and limited exceptions. 6
When an exceptional case occurs, the TRIPS Agreement places limits on
the production and exportation of cheap generic versions of patented
products, and provides for compensation 9 to the patent holder.
C. Relevant Articles and Provisions
The preamble states the purpose of the TRIPS Agreement is to "reduce
distortions and impediments to international trade, and taking into account
the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual
property rights, and to ensure that measure and procedures to enforce
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate
trade."' 0
Article 7 sets out the objectives of the agreement. The objectives
reflect more than an interest in protecting intellectual property rights.
Article 7 protects these rights in a way that is mutually beneficial to both
producers and the consumers. These rights are to be enforced "in a manner
conducive to social and economic welfare, and a balancing of rights and
obligations.""
Article 8 establishes the principles of the agreement. It states that
"[m]embers may, in formulating, or amending their laws and regulations,
adopt measures necessary to protect public health and nutrition, and to
promote the public interest in sectors of vital importance to their socioeconomic and technological development, provided that such measures are
consistent with the provisions of this Agreement."' 2 Article 8 also states
that nations may take steps to prevent the "abuse" of intellectual property
rights or practices that "unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the
international transfer of technology.' 13 Any action taken, however, must
again be consistent with the agreement.14
6 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 28, para. 1,
Apr. 15, 1994, 33 I.L.M 81, available at http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal-e/27trips.pdf [hereinafter TRIPS] (The TRIPS Agreement is Annex 1C of the Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization); Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 109.
7 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 28.
8 See id. art. 31 (f).
9 Id. art. 31 (h).
'0 Id. pmbl.

Id. art. 7.
12Id. art. 8(1).

13TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 8(2).
14 Id.
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Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement provides the basic parameters of
patent protection. This article provides that all parties must make patents
"available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all fields of
15
technology" subject to standard intellectual property requirements.
Article 27 also includes some basic exceptions to the grant of such
protection. 6 One such exception effectively allows countries to deny patent
protection in circumstances where such denial would be necessary to
protect public health and the environment.1 7 The scope of this exception is
not clear from the language, however, and may be read broadly or narrowly
in its application.
Article 28 describes the rights conferred by a patent. This article
provides specifically that a patent holder shall have the exclusive rights "to
prevent third parties not having the owner's consent from the acts of:
making, usini, offering for sale, selling, or importing for these purposes
that product.8
Article 30 is entitled "Exceptions to Rights Inferred" and, as the title
suggests, describes the type of limited exceptions allowed by the TRIPS
Agreement to the rights conferred by a patent.' 9 Effectively, this article
creates "limited exceptions 20 to patent rights so long as the country is able
to show that the patent holder's interests are not unreasonably infringed
upon.2 '

Article 31 is entitled "Other Use Without Authorization of the Right
Holder" and is commonly referred to as the "Compulsory Licensing"
provision. This article, along with Articles 27 and 30, describes an
exception to rights conferred by a patent issued by a party to the TRIPS
Agreement. 222 Compulsory licensing recognizes the government authority
of a party to the agreement to force the licensing of a patent that would
otherwise be protected by intellectual property laws. 3
Government
licensing effectively allows for distribution of a patented product to its
citizens. 24 The article dictates that payment should be made to the patent

15 Id. art.

27(1); see Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 363.

See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 27(2).
17 Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 112.
Is TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 28(l)(a).
16

'9Id. art. 30.
20 Id.

21 Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 112.
22 See TRIPS, supra note 6, at arts. 27, 30-31; see also Dora Kripapuri, Note, Reasoned
Compulsory Licensing: Applying US. Antitrust's "Rule of Reason " to TRIP's Compulsory
Licensing Provision, 36 NEw ENG. L. REv. 669, 676 (2002).
23 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31.
24 See id. art. 31 (f).

Brazil'sRecent Threat on Abbott's Patent

27:199 (2006)

holder for the relinquishment of his property rights,25 but in reality the sum
is generally nominal and is modest in comparison both to the amount
invested by the patent-holder and the potential returns available under the
usual regulatory scheme.26 Article 31 provides for five types of situations
in which granting compulsory licenses would be appropriate: refusal to
deal, 2 national emergency or extreme urgency, 3 anti-competitive
30
practices, 29 non-commercial use, and dependent patents. 1
Article 31 defines conditions for compulsory licensing. First, Member
Nations must make efforts to obtain permission to use the patent from the
patent holder "on reasonable commercial terms and conditions" and show
"that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of
time., 32 An exception to this requirement is provided "in the case of a
national emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency or in cases
of public non-commercial use., 3 3 Second, the compulsory license must be
limited only to the purpose for which it was authorized.3 The license may
not be exclusive,35 and it is not assignable.36 Also, the license must be
predominantly used for the domestic market in which it was granted.37 The
license must be revocable.3 8 There must be adequate remuneration for the
use of the patent.39 Finally, the license and its terms are judicially
reviewable. 4
Article 31 (f) of the TRIPS Agreement provides a significant restriction
on the use of a compulsory license by restricting options for parallel
import/export of generic medications. 4 1 A compulsory license under Article
31 does not grant the license holder the right to export the generic version

25 Id. art. 31 (h).

Kripapuri, supra note 22, at 670.
27 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 3 1(b).
28 id.
29 Subsection (k) of the Article provides that efforts to obtain authorization for use of the
26

patent from the patent holder are not required "where compulsory licensing is permitted to
remedy a practice determined after judicial or administrative process to be anti-competitive."
Id. art. 31 (k).
30 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 3 1(b).
31 Id. art. 31(1).
32 Id. art. 31 (b).
33 Id.

34 Id. art. 31 (c).

" Id. art. 31 (d).
36 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 3 1(e).
37 Id. art. 31 (f).
38 Id. art. 31 (g).
31 Id. art. 31 (h).
40 Id. art. 3 1(i).
41 Id. art. 3 l(f).
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of the drug to other countries; conversely, a country granted a compulsory
license may not import the generic version of the drug. This provision
reduces potential market competition to patent holders, giving a significant
advantage to the U.S. and British governments who maintain control over
the majority of pharmaceutical companies and subsequently their patents.42
This ability to commandeer patents arguably allows these governments to
negotiate for reasonable prices with the patent-holders.
Developing
countries under the TRIPS Agreement remain at the mercy of the
pharmaceutical companies.4 3 However, the WTO has provided an interim
waiver of Article 31(f) allowing qualified Member Nations to import
generic versions of patented pharmaceuticals produced under compulsory
44
licenses in other countries.
This waiver was meant to benefit poorer
countries in the midst of a public health crisis without the means of
domestic production.
Article 70(8) makes specific reference to the protection of
pharmaceutical patents. 45 At the time the TRIPS Agreement went into
effect, many developing nations did not recognize or enforce patent
protection for pharmaceuticals. Article 70(8) attempted to correct this by
requiring Member Nations not yet providing "patent protection for
pharmaceuticals... commensurate with its obligation under Article 27" to
do so as part of compliance.46
Overall, the TRIPS Agreement does provide some highly limited and
poorly defined aveneues into the realm of compulsory licensing of patent
protected pharmaceutical inventions. Arguably, this vagueness subjects
poorer countries to the whim of interpretation and application of the terms
of the TRIPS Agreement.
D. Amendment and Interpretation Regarding Public Health Concerns: The
Doha Declaration
The WTO held the Ministerial Conference in Doha in November 2001
to address and clarify international trade issues. By the time the conference
was held, the WTO was forced to address the increasing number of
concerns surrounding the TRIPS Agreement,
specifically those relating to
47
public health in developing countries.
Developing countries asserted that the exceptions in Article 27 of the
42 See Mayne, supra note 5, at 150-51.
41 See id. at 151.

44 General Council, Implementation of paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the
TRIPS Agreement and public health, WT/L/540 and Corr. 1 (Sept. 1, 2003), available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/trips-e/implempara6_e.htm.
45 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 70(8).
46

Id.; see Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 363-64.

47 See Mayne, supra note 5, at 149.
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Agreement needed further official clarification in order for oorer countries
to be able to utilize them free from fear of controversy. 8 Specifically,
developing countries argued that they hesitated to implement "parallel
trading or compulsory licensing for fear of trade sanctions or legal actions
by Western governments and pharmaceutical industries. 4 9 Predictably,
pharmaceutical companies from many of the developed countries lobbied
against any amendment to the TRIPS Agreement, arguing that the language
already contained therein was sufficient. °
In addition to raising issues surrounding domestic production rights, a
group of developing countries, including Brazil, lobbied for the ability to
export generic versions of pharmaceuticals manufactured domestically
Perhaps this underscores the economic
under a compulsory license.'
factors motivating the public health push (to lower pharmaceutical prices
for poorer countries worldwide), and it may well validate the concerns of
the "greedy" pharmaceutical industry that the TRIPS Agreement would lead
to a global collapse of drug prices.
Trade representatives from wealthy developed countries unexpectedly
agreed to the developing nations' proposed public health clarification of the
TRIPS Agreement. These propositions were at odds with the property
protection concerns generally characteristic of wealthy nations, as the
propositions "affirmed the primacy of public health over private patent
rights. 52 The conference ultimately issued an official declaration ("Doha
Declaration") stating that:
[T]he TRIPS Agreement does not and should not prevent Members
from taking measures to protect public health. Accordingly, while
reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS Agreement, we affirm that
the Agreement can and should be interpreted and implemented in a
manner supportive of WTO Members' right to protect public health
and, in particular, to promote access to medicines for all. In this
connection, we reaffirm the right of WTO Members to use, to the
TRIPS Agreement, which provide
full, the provisions in the
3
flexibility for this purpose.
This statement, issued at the close of the conference, was intended to close
the gap between the TRIPS Agreement's emphasis on commercial concerns

48 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 366.
49

Id.

50 Id.

" Id. at 372.
52 See Mayne, supra note 5, at 149-50.
53 Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, para. 6, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2
(Nov. 20, 2001), availableat http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/ministe/min0le/min

01_e.htm [hereinafter Doha Declaration].
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of patent owners and public health concerns.
The conference, in addition to addressing Article 27 of the Agreement,
also considered the controversial provisions of Article 31. The Doha
Declaration included a statement specifically referencing the use of
compulsory licenses: "Each Member has the right to grant compulsory
licenses and the freedom
to determine the grounds upon which such
4
licenses are granted.,1
The Doha Declaration also clarified the circumstances that constitute a
"national emergency" under Article 31. "Each Member has the right to
determine what constitutes a national emergency or other circumstances of
extreme urgency, it being understood that public health crises, including
those relating to HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other epidemics, can
represent 55 a national emergency or other circumstances of extreme
urgency.
The Doha Declaration potentially allows governments of developing
countries to use the existing provision of the TRIPS Agreement to protect
public health without challenge.5 6 The Doha Declaration did not and could
not, however, remove the potential for external pressures. It remains to be
seen how effective this kind of official support will be in allowing
developing countries to utilize the exceptions provided to them under the
TRIPS Agreement.
As the existence of this and many other disputes will attest, the Doha
Declaration did not solve all of the problems relating to public health
arising out of the TRIPS Agreement, but5 7 it was a step forward and an
important victory for developing countries.
E. Current State of the Ability of Developing Countries to Produce and
Export Generic Versions of Patented Medicines
The conflict at the Doha Ministerial Conference, and almost any other
regarding the application of the TRIPS Agreement to public health issues,
leads to the question of just what does the TRIPS Agreement allow. Taking
into account the original document, and its amendments and clarifications,
what exactly are developing countries allowed to do? The quick answer is
that the application of benefits envisioned by the TRIPS Agreement and its
exceptions will vary dramatically from country to country.5 8 Until

54

Id. para. 5(b).

55 id.

56 See Mayne, supra note 5, at 150.
51 See id.
58See generally Wesley A. Cann, Jr., CreatingStandards andAccountability for the Use
of the WTO Exception: Reducing the Role of Power-Based Relations and Establishing a
BalanceBetween Sovereignty and Multilateralism,26 YALE J. INT'L. L. 413 (2001).
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precedent or amendment further defines the provisions set out in the TRIPS
Agreement, the success rate of utilizing the agreement's exceptions to
patent rights will depend on how courts interpret those exceptions amidst
the balance of public health concerns and the property interests of the patent
holders.5 9
The "national emergency" exception allowing compulsory licensing of
a product serves as a general example of the uncertain nature of the
application of exceptions under the TRIPS Agreement. 60 Despite the Doha
Declaration's attempt at clarification, the WTO has not provided a precise
definition of what constitutes a "national emergency" for purposes of the
compulsory licensing exception.
This type of imprecision may be an
inherent byproduct of the relative newness of the TRIPS Agreement, but it
is likely to lead to disparate application and general confusion until such
vagueness is cured.62
Critics argue that under the current TRIPS Agreement the production
of generic medicines will be progressively curtailed. 63 The TRIPS
Agreement presently restricts both the export of cheap generic drugs and
their production. 64 Restriction of production in combination with the
extension of patent protection to a twenty year period in all countries means
that "generic production for both domestic use and for export of new
medicines will become dependant on a complicated web of compulsory
licensing and other exceptions. ,,65 This alw
allows pharmaceutical companies
to maintain and strengthen their hold over markets in developing countries
and consequently to set higher prices for their drugs. 66 "This points to a
need for a much more substantive reform of the TRIP's [sic] Agreement
than is currently contemplated by the WTO.

67

Some argue that the potential success of developing countries in using
the TRIPS Agreement exceptions to break pharmaceutical patents and to
produce generic versions of patented drugs will depend entirely on the "the
willingness of developed countries to respect the flexibility" provided by
the TRIPS Agreement. 68
Furthermore, without assurances of such
flexibility by developed countries, developing countries will be unable to

59 Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 112-13.
60 See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31(f).
61 Kripapuri, supra note 22, at 691; See Doha Declaration, supranote 53, para. 5(b).
62 See Kripapuri, supra note 22, at 692, for a general discussion of the potential breadth
of interpretation and application of this phrase.
63 See Mayne, supra note 5, at 154.

64id.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 id.

68 Lazzarini, supra note 1,at 133.
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meet their obligations both to international patent holders and their citizens
threatened by impending health crises. 69 This argument suggests that the
TRIPS Agreement, as it exists today, provides the upper hand to patent
holders and leaves developing countries to cater to those holding the chips.

III. OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND ON RECENT CONTROVERSY
BETWEEN BRAZIL AND ABBOTT LABORATORIES
A. Background
To understand fully what is at stake in the conflict between Brazil and
Abbott Laboratories, it is necessary to consider relevant statistical and
factual background relating to the AIDS epidemic generally, the cost of
treatment, and the effects of both on Brazil. The year 2006 will mark the
In 2001, the United
twenty-fifth anniversary of the AIDS pandemic.
Nations calculated the death toll worldwide at twenty-two million. 7' A
vaccine is estimated to be ten years away.72 In the United States and
developed countries, AIDS has become a livable condition through the
effective use of a combination of anti-AIDS medications known as
antiretrovirals. 3 These antiretroviral combinations are expensive and
typically cost a patient $10,000-$15,000 per year.74
Brazil became caught up in the AIDS epidemic in the early 1990s, and
75
faced a projected rate of infection of 1.2 million people by the year 2000.
In reaction to these grim predictions, the Brazilian government adopted a
national policy that guaranteed all persons with HIV the right to free access
to antiretroviral treatment.7 6 After the implementation of this national
policy, the death rate attributed to the AIDS virus fell sixty percent. 77 By
2002 at least 100,000 of Brazil's citizens were receiving antiretroviral
medications from the government in order to combat the virus. 78 This
turning of the tide was almost universally attributed to the antiretroviral
program sponsored by the Brazilian government.7 9
The ability of the Brazilian government to provide this kind of access

Id. at 133-34.
See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 353-54.
71 Id. at 353.
72 Id. at 354.
69
70

73 Id.

74 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 355; Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 129.
75 Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 128.
76

Id.

77 Id.
78 Id.
79 id.
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to its citizens was a product of "government commitment, the reduced cost
of pharmaceuticals made possible by domestic manufacture of generic
drugs, and negotiated price discounts for other drugs."80 In 2001, the
Brazilian government was paying $4,137 annually to provide medication to
each person infected.81 In comparison to the medication costs of victims
living in the United States, Brazil's program had managed to reduce the
cost of antiretrovirals
to less than half the price being paid in developed
82
countries.
B. External Events Contributing to and Explaining Brazil's Position in the
Controversy
In the time preceding the recent controversy between Brazil and
Abbott Laboratories over the production and sale of Kaletra, there were a
number of external events that may have contributed to the rising tensions.
Each of these occurrences would not alone justify Brazil's position, but the
combination of events created an international climate that provides a
contextual basis for Brazil's actions.
First, in 2005, the remaining countries whose laws supported genericproducing companies were required to implement the TRIPS Agreement,
effectively eliminating the last source for affordable generic versions of
much needed medicines. 83 Specifically, India, one of the major sources for
cheap generic alternatives to otherwise patent-protected products, was given
until January 1, 2006 to comply with the TRIPS Agreement. 84 The preTRIPS Agreement production and distribution of generic medicines had
many benefits. For example, in 2001, a leading generic pharmaceutical
manufacturer in India (who at the time was under no international patent
protection restrictions) offered to sell the South African government generic
versions of antiretroviral medications at a fraction of the prices offered by
the patent holders. 85 In response to this offer, the large pharmaceutical
companies holding the patents to these drugs significantly lowered their
prices in Africa. 8 Not to be outdone, some pharmaceutical companies
offered their drugs to the ailing countries at cost.
It can be argued that by barring manufacture by countries that have the
technical capacity to produce and distribute generic versions of these
expensive medications, a monopoly will be formed. The majority of
80Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 129.
81 id.
82 id.

83 See Mayne, supra note 5, at 151.
84Kripapuri, supra note 22, at 688.
85 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 357.
86 Id.
87

id.
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pharmaceutical patents are held by only a handful of countries, including
the United States, Great Britain, Germany, Japan, and Switzerland.88 If the
pharmaceutical manufacturers are also the patent holders, they may choose
to extract a monopoly profit from a drug rather than license the patent to
allow others to manufacture the drug. Without the competition provided by
multiple manufacturers of a drug, the market price will inevitably be higher.
The developing countries most in need of inexpensive licenses to patents
held by companies in industrialized nations will be left without access or
means to obtain affordable medicines.
Second, the WTO recently extended the term of patent protection
under the TRIPS Agreement to twenty years. 89 This increase in the duration
of patent protection is exacerbated by the fast moving pace of the AIDS
virus itself as well as the pace of research and development. Both factors
render most new AIDS medications obsolete after a matter of years, making
access to generic versions of those medications impossible. Some argue
that this predicament leaves developing countries "dependent on a
complicated web of compulsory licensing and other exceptions." 90 Brazil's
threatened invocation of those exceptions may not, as the argument goes, be
unreasonable under these circumstances.
The third and most basic factor contributing to Brazil's position is the
cost to the government of providing treatment to its citizens. Brazil
provides AIDS drugs to its citizens who need them free of charge, but as
mentioned before it costs the government roughly $4,137 per patient. 9 1
Currently there are an estimated 160,000 patients.92 Brazil has managed to
keep costs down through various means, including the legal domestic
manufacture of generic versions of HIV and AIDS medications existing
prior to 1994 as "TRIPS applies only to drugs patented and placed on the
market after that date." 93 However, due to the changing nature of the
disease and the constant development of new drugs to combat new
mutations and strains, the drugs falling within the pre-1994 category will
soon be obsolete.94

The last and most controversial factor contributing to Brazil's actions

88

Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines Decision: World PharmaceuticalTrade and

the Protection of PublicHealth, 99 AM. J. INT'L. L. 317, 324 (2005).
89 See Understanding the WTO, Intellectual Property: Protection and Enforcement,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto e/whatise/tife/agrm7_e.htm (last visited Feb. 4, 2006).
90 Mayne, supra note 5, at 154.
91Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 129.
92 Brazil Reaches With Abbott Labs in AIDS Drug Dispute, ASSOCIATED PRESS, October

12,

2005,

available

at

http://abclocal.go.com/wls/story?section=local&id=3528743

[hereinafter Brazil Reaches].
93 Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 132-33.
94 Id. at 133.
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is the fact that threats to produce generic versions of pharmaceuticals
without a license from the patent holder have served Brazil well in the
past. 95 In March 2001, Brazil made a similar threat to Merck regarding
their patented anti-AIDS drugs, and Merck responded by reducing prices.
In August 2001, shortly after the Merck success, Brazil threatened the
Swiss drug company, Roche, and received a forty percent reduction on the
price of their drug, Viracept. 97 This may validate the idea that threats to
manufacture generic medicines without a license from the patentee are an
effective way to keep drug prices at an acceptable level, or at least one that
the Brazilian government deems affordable.
C. External Events Contributing to and Explaining Abbott's Position in the
Controversy
The first circumstance justifying Abbott's resistance to Brazil's
requests is the fact that Brazil has a recognized history of abusing
intellectual property rights.98 Brazil's request in the area of pharmaceutical
patents may be characterized as a continuation of a larger trend. At the
least it might lead to a suspicion of Brazil's motivations being more
economic, and not related solely to public health. 99
Also, the
aforementioned pattern of threats by Brazil to infringe pharmaceutical
AIDS patents may reflect this cavalier attitude toward property rights. 00
The very fact that this is not the first time Brazil has made this kind of
threat may discredit the urgency of the present situation.
Another factor supporting Abbott's resistance is Brazil's "local
working" requirement. In 1996 Brazil adopted the Industrial Property Law,
which stated that patent protection would be extended to products
developed after the TRIPS Agreement so long as the manufacturer
commences conducting some part of the production of the drug in Brazil

95 See Ubirajara Regis Quintanilha Marques, Valesak Santos Guimaraes & Caitlin
Sternberg, Brazil's AIDS Controversy: Antiretroviral Drugs, Breaking Patents, and
Compulsory Licensing, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 471, 474 (2005).

96 See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 357-58.
97 Id.

98 See id.; see also Office of the United States Trade Representative, Brazil Generalized
System of Preferences Intellectual Property Rights Review Extended, 12/06/04, available at
http://www.ustr.gov/DocumenLLibrary/Press-Releases/2004/December/BrazilGeneralized
-System -of PreferencesIntellectual_PropertyRights_ReviewExtended.html (last visited
Oct. 25, 2006) [hereinafter Generalized System of Preferences].
99 See infra Section IV. for a discussion of the economic implications of maintaining
public health and the suggestion that matters of economy and public health may hold
separate places in Brazil's motivation in pushing for lower costs. See also Generalized
System of Preferences, supra note 98.
10 See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 357-58.
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within three years. 101 The adoption of this law, in addition to the TRIPS
Agreement exemption for drugs on the market before 1994, has allowed the
Brazilian government to license generic local production of eight of the
twelve antiretroviral medications currently being used to treat the AIDS
virus.'0 2 The adoption of this law has led to considerable controversy and
in 2001 culminated with the United 0States
filing a complaint with the WTO
3
against Brazil for its use of the law.1
D. The Substantive Controversy
The TRIPS Agreement has often been touted as "a compromise
between the interests of the developed and developing world."' 10 4 As such
the Brazil/Abbott Labs dispute exemplifies the competing interests at play
within the agreement.
In June 2005, Brazil's Health Ministry threatened to infringe the patent
on Kaletra, an anti-AIDS medication owned and developed by Abbott
Laboratories; Brazil said that it would produce a generic version of the drug
in government laboratories unless Abbott agreed to lower the price or
voluntarily grant patent rights to the Brazilian government. 10 5 Kaletra is
one of the medications included in "the so-called drug cocktail used to treat
patients with HIV or AIDS;" in justifying its position, the health ministry
asserted that the price of Kaletra "previous to the agreement was
0 6 so high
that it endangered the sustainability of Brazil's AIDS program.'
IV. THE EFFECTS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT ON THE RECENT
DISPUTE AND RESOLUTION
A. Arguments for Abbott Under the TRIPS Agreement
The main argument for Abbott under the TRIPS Agreement is simply
that no accepted definition of "national emergency" has been put forth by
the WTO,'0° and Brazil has yet to successfully manufacture patented
pharmaceuticals under any provision defined in the TRIPS Agreement. 10 8
101Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 129; Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 358.
102 Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 129.
103 See Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 358 (discussing the elements of the complaint
and its outcome).
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The case of Brazil is certainly not the direst, 0 9 and therefore Brazil should
not be granted a compulsory license to manufacture Abbott's patentprotected medicine. There are additional arguments available to Abbott,
however, under several of the various Articles of the TRIPS Agreement.
1. Argument Under Article 70(8)
The most basic argument available to Abbott under the TRIPS
Agreement is the specific inclusion of pharmaceutical patents within its
provisions. The explicit reference to pharmaceutical patents in Article
70(8), in conjunction with Article 27's basic patent protections, makes clear
that the TRIPS Agreement was intended to enforce pharmaceutical patent
rights, and this coverage represents one of the largest victories for the
pharmaceutical companies developing and producing the drugs." In order
for this argument to hold, however, Abbott must address the question of
whether any exceptions to this basic provision of protection apply in this
case. This requires an evaluation of those exceptions and separate
arguments refuting the application of each one under the circumstances.
2. Argument Against the Application ofArticle 27 Exceptions
The Article 27 exception that denies patent protection in order to
protect public order and "human life" contains no specific language
regarding the interpretation and application of those terms.
Pharmaceutical companies argue against a broad interpretation of this
language, because an exception to patent protection whenever human life is
implicated would completely eliminate the use of pharmaceutical patents, as
pharmaceuticals inherently deal with the promotion and preservation of
human life.' 2 As a corollary argument, a broad interpretation and
application of this exception would conflict with the protection provided to
pharmaceutical patents under Article 70(8).' 13
3. Argument Against the Application of Exceptions Provided in Article 31
Article 31 's provision for compulsory licensing is the exception most
likely to be sought in any case involving pharmaceutical patents. One way
to prevent a compulsory license from being issued under Article 31 is to

109 Id. at 471 (noting the comparison between Brazil's number of citizens infected with
AIDS, which currently sits at less than one percent of the total population and the South
African infection rate, which is well over twenty percent).
110 Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 364; TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 70(8).
111Sherman & Oakley, supra note 4, at 368.
112 Id.
113 Id.
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attack the conditions that must be satisfied in order to use the exception." 4
The first provision, found in Article 31(b), requires that the proposed user
attempt to gain authorization for the use of the patent from the patent holder
under "reasonable commercial terms and conditions." ' 5 It could be argued
that Brazil's efforts to obtain authorization are unreasonable and that the
terms and conditions surrounding those demands, namely threats to
disregard patent protection for Kaletra, supersede reasonable commercial
processes required under Article 31(b). Brazil may certainly counter that
the commercially reasonable negotiations under Article 31(b) are not
required because this is a exceptional case of "national emergency" or
"public non-commercial use."'
The Doha Declaration's statement
regarding the term "national emergency" aids in its interpretation but falls
short of providing a concrete definition." 7 Despite the vague nature of that
statement, the Doha Declaration's direct reference to the AIDS epidemic
may bolster Brazil's argument. However, Brazil's established pattern of
threats to pharmaceutical companies under the guise of national emergency
may again lessen its credibility.
There are also policy arguments against the use of compulsory
licensing of pharmaceutical patents for AIDS drugs.
For example,
compulsory licensing may create a perverse incentive to not manufacture
drugs most likely to be subject to compulsory licensing. 118 Generally
speaking, this would include drugs needed to treat fatal diseases such as
AIDS rampant in developing countries. This chilling effect on drug
development also implicates trade relations. Pharmaceutical companies
may avoid entering the market of countries that do not have robust
protection of intellectual property rights." 9 This would lead to losses for
both parties.
Another problem with compulsory licensing involves the nature of the
diseases these drugs are meant to treat. It is possible that more resistant
120
strains of the AIDS virus will develop, rendering existing drugs useless.
Currently, there are no drugs that cure AIDS or HIV, and the argument goes
that providing widespread access to these drugs without strict supervision
will only lead to more virulent and drug-resistant strains of the virus that
will kill more victims.12' According to this argument, the loss of profits
See TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 31(b)-(j).
"5 Id. art. 31(b).
116 id.
117 Doha Declaration, supra note 53, para. 5(b).
118 Kripapuri, supra note 22, at 671.
119Id. at 697; see also Richard Adelstein, Equity and Efficiency in the Marketfor Ideas,
17 CONN. J. INT'L L. 249, 260 (2002).
120Kripapuri, supra note 22, at 671.
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from compulsory licensing and uncontrolled distribution triggers a domino
effect crippling, and in a worst case scenario bankrupting, the
pharmaceutical companies forced to license their patents and develop drugs
for an exploding number of strains of the virus. The argument for
recouping costs for AIDS drugs through the use of patent protection and
high prices thus becomes more relevant and applicable in the case of a
mutating disease.
As a practical matter, there is the fear that cheap generic versions of
patented drugs produced as a result of compulsory licensing would possibly
infiltrate the more lucrative markets. 122 The TRIPS Agreement and the
compulsory licensing article specifically include a provision meant to guard
against just such an outcome. Subsection (f) of Article 31, as discussed
earlier, is intended to limit the use of a compulsory license to mainly
domestic markets. The language is not absolute, however, and it is again
unclear to what extent parallel importing would be allowed should generic
versions of patented AIDS drugs be manufactured under a compulsory
license.
4. Arguments Supporting the Need for Patent Protection
According to the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America, research and development is "the key to pharmaceutical
innovation., 123 Furthermore, research and development is a "long, risky
and expensive" process. 124 The average cost of developing a new drug is
above $800 million. 25 The average time taken in development is 14.2
years, yet the average patent life of a drug is comparatively short (1 1 to 12
years compared to the 18.5 year patent life in other industries). 126 As little
as 1 in 10,000 candidates screened compounds will result in a medicine that
can be sold-patent protection is needed so that the research and
development expenses associated with successful and failed efforts can be
recovered. 27 Therefore, patent protection is needed in order to yield any
return on investments and thus incentivize the continuing development of
new drugs. Also, while pharmaceuticals are incredibly costly to create, they
are fairly easy and inexpensive to copy and reproduce. 28 Thus, even poor,
Id. at 671.
123 Wesley A. Cann, Jr., On the Relationship Between Intellectual Property Rights and
122
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developing countries are able to pirate these products and harm the
pharmaceutical companies that originally developed the drug. For these
reasons, the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America
maintain that intellectual property protection is essential for the existence of
a pharmaceutical industry. 2 9
5.Response to Concerns About the Negative Impact of the TRIPS
Agreement
In response to the call for a reduction of patent rights as a means of
helping developing countries gain access to much needed medications,
"pharmaceutical companies and the governments of [industrialized
countries] initially insisted that the issue was a red herring, and that other
factors were far more important in explaining the lack of access."' 130 The
same companies and governments also asserted that a reduction of
intellectual property rights, even if limited to developing countries, would
ultimately inhibit or chill research and development for drugs in the
future.13 In the extreme, supporters of pharmaceutical patent protection put
forth the idea that completely dismantling the current system of patent
protection to create greater access to medications now may leave
pharmaceutical developers without the resources to respond to the "next
great global epidemic. 1 32
Strong supporters of pharmaceutical patent protection argue that the
harm caused by higher prices of patented drugs is counterbalanced by the
continual expiration of older pharmaceutical patents, because the expiration
of a patent causes a drop in the price of the drug it once protected, as the
expired patent no longer prevents competitors from manufacturing
competing generic versions of the drug.133 The argument is that for every
drug a developing country cannot afford, another one once protected by a
now-expired patent will become affordable. Unfortunately, this argument
assumes that older drugs will meet the needs of developing countries, which
is not the case with AIDS drugs. AIDS medications are generally part of a
combination therapy. Newer drugs are often necessary as alternatives to
regimens that have failed or are no longer effective, or as a cure to serious
side effects of the ever-changing regimens. 134 The present twenty year
mandatory protection for each patent under the TRIPS Agreement means
that AIDS drugs are likely to be obsolete and ineffective by the time their

129 Id. at 793-94.
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associated patents expire.
B. Argument for Brazil Under the TRIPS Agreement
1. Argument Under Articles 7 and 8
Articles 7 and 8 suggest that Brazil's use would be within the TRIPS
Agreement's objectives and principles.' 35 Brazil's use would be beneficial
to social welfare according to the Article 7 balance 136 and would properly
fit into the public health exception provided by Article 8.137 This argument
is strengthened by the statement included in the Doha Declaration
emphasizing the consideration
138 of Articles 7 and 8 when interpreting other
provisions of the Agreement.
2. Argument Under Article 27
Under Article 27,,Brazil should be able to refuse to enforce any patent
protection of the drug because the exploitation of the drug is necessary to
protect public health. " 9
3. Argument Under Article 30
Brazil's use of the drug would fall under Article 30's limited
exceptions. As the article left the scope of "limited exceptions" undefined,
qualifying the situation as such would be simple enough.14 0 The problem
comes, however, when approaching the other requirements of Article 30.
Brazil must then show that their proposed use of Kaletra would not
"unreasonably conflict with a normal exploitation" of the drug, and would
not "unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests" of Abbott. 4
4. Argument Under Article 31
The most viable argument arises under the compulsory licensing
provisions found in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement. 42 Article 31
expressly grants the right for governments to seek compulsory licenses for
patents, and there are arguments that Brazil could assert rights under this

135 See TRIPS, supra note 6, at arts. 7, 8 (emphasizing the Agreement's goal of adopting
measures to protect the social welfare of members).
136
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43

article.
An argument can be made that the use of Kaletra in this instance
would fall under the guise of "national emergency" as provided for in
Article 31(b) 144 and could thereby be justified.
Also, the Doha
Declaration's grant of power to each Member Nation to decide for itself the
conditions of a national emergency may bolster this argument. 145 It is not
clear, for example, that the WTO requires that Brazil be steeped in disease
before declaring the compulsory licensing a necessity. The licensing of a
medication against the will of the patent holder may be a necessary means
of averting such disaster. It is unclear, however, how well an argument
such as this would hold without some clear declaration from the WTO. As
the Doha Declaration shows, the WTO has been hesitant to provide a
concrete definition
of "national emergency" on which an outcome could be
46
easily predicted. 1
5. Debunking the Needfor PatentProtection of Pharmaceuticalsin
Developing Countries
In 2002 the British Government set up an independent Commission on
Intellectual Property Rights. 147 The Commission published a report
criticizing public health related aspects of the TRIPS Agreement and its
application. The report stated that "the evidence suggests that patent
protection has an effect on the prices charged for medicines ... in the
absence of patents more people would be able to afford the treatments they
need." 48 The argument this statement would support may be too broad as it
suggests a call for the removal of all pharmaceutical patent protection when
affordability requires it. The public health crisis exception under the TRIPS
Agreement would appear to be a better compromise to address the concern
in the report, and the finding empirically supports the need to allow such
exceptions.
There is also an argument against the need for patent protection to
support the continued existence of research and development. However, the
report from the independent Commission on Intellectual Property Rights
noted that "the evidence suggests that the IP system hardly plays any role in
stimulating research on diseases particularly prevalent in developing
countries, except for those diseases where there is also a substantial market
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in the developed world., 149 The question then becomes how much of the
market for Kaletra is made up of the "developed world." If most of the
impetus for research and development of Kaletra and other drugs does not
come from developing countries, enforcing patent protection in those
countries does not significantly impact research and development activity.
Many critics question the idea that patent protection is absolutely
necessary to incentivize research and development, especially in the case of
developing countries. "Patent-driven research is primarily supported by
profits derived from the lucrative Western markets and not by any
anticipated profits in impoverished nations. '' 5° Some critics even suggest
that strong patent protection can actually deter further research and
development by discouraging potential researchers from pursuing the
that involve the use of other patentdevelopment of new medications
151
protected pharmaceuticals.
It has also been argued that the amount expended on research and
development and the amount of income gained from a patented drug are not
necessarily directly correlated.152 Some have even asserted that the research
and development costs cited by the pharmaceutical industry are actually
inflated because they do not reflect the federal government subsidies the
industry receives. Also, the industry receives substantial tax credits for
various development53costs that may not be reflected in stated research and
development costs. 1
In general, it is questionable to what degree patent protection and the
154
resulting high prices are necessary to support research and development.
The pharmaceutical industry is consistently one of the most profitable.'
Furthermore, the most financially successful pharmaceutical companies use
less money for research and development (18.5 %) than they do for
marketing and administration (30.4 %).156
Even if high prices stimulate research and development, they are not
the only means of doing so. Supporters of patent protection reform
generally argue for alternatives in the form of government involvement,
either through direct financial assistance or organization of funding.' 57 In
countries such as the United States, where pharmaceutical development has
remained almost entirely untouched by the government and capitalist
149Id.
150 Cann, supra note 123,
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principles drive the development of most new products, increased
government participation in pharmaceutical research and development is
hardly a likely alternative.
As a general criticism, some accuse the current system of intellectual
property protection as being a one-sided endeavor. Countries who prioritize
"technical discoveries and innovation" and are able to financially support
and maintain a "research infrastructure" will inevitably benefit from strong
patent protections; whereas, countries who lack these qualities will not.'
Some critics go so far as to assert that "trade liberalization" (a term used for
the introduction of international patent protection) leads to
"neocolonialism," as it disproportionately benefits the wealthy
industrialized nations holding all of the patents in need of protection. 159 As
a general rule, developing6 countries generally have far fewer and less
valuable patents to protect.1 0
V. RESOLUTION AND ANALYSIS: WHO CAME OUT AHEAD?
A. Resolution
In October 2005, Abbott Labs and Brazil's Health Ministry came to an
16 1
agreement after nearly five months of highly publicized negotiations.
Ultimately, Abbott agreed to lower the price of Kaletra from $1.17 to $0.63
a pill, saving Brazil $339 million over the course of six years. 162 This
figure is considerable in light of Brazil's projected savings had they
manufactured the drug generically; Brazil's Health Ministry estimated
savings at $54 million annually.' 63 In return, Brazil agreed not to produce
the generic version domestically. 64
B. Pressures on Brazil to Resolve the Issue
Critics have long asserted that in the current system of intellectual
property protection public health concerns are systematically losing out to
corporate greed. Specifically, some have voiced "concerns about the way
in which the United States is using unilateral pressures, and bilateral and
regional trade agreements, to ratchet up patent protection on medicines
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beyond the standard in the TRIPS Agreement." 16 5 These critics deny being
against patents or property protection per se, but rather they are "against the
unbalanced nature of global rules which, they argue, prioritize private
patent 'rights' over public health goals."' 166 The recent controversy and
resolution between Brazil and the U.S.-based Abbott Laboratories raises the
question of whether the United States used external political pressure to
force a negotiated resolution with Brazil outside of the TRIPS Agreement
framework.
The effects of Brazil carrying out its threat and infringing Abbott's
patent on Kaletra could have been potentially devastating to U.S.-Brazil
trade relations, and consequently Brazil's economy. The Brazil/Abbott
Labs dispute occurred while a review of the continued inclusion of Brazil
under the U.S. Generalized System of Preferences was imminent.1 67 It was
reported that the final resolution between Brazil and Abbott Laboratories
"was reached after threats of commercial retaliations were made by the U.S.
government in response to Brazil's plan to produce locally a generic version
of Kaletra."' 1 68 One may assume that Abbott used its lobbying power to
enlist the U.S. government in its battle against pharmaceutical piracy, and
that the commercial retaliation most readily available to the U.S.
government at the time of the dispute was the removal of Brazil from the
Generalized System of Preferences.
This accusation is not terribly far fetched. The U.S. government has
generally been openly supportive of protection of pharmaceutical patent
rights.
For example, in May 1999, officials within the Clinton
administration went on record as supporting such protection. 169 These
officials explained the reasoning behind the United States' international
trade policy concerning pharmaceuticals, stating that "tampering with AIDS
drug patents threatens the intellectual property rights protection which
ensures the search for new drugs."' 170 United States involvement in this
dispute should not come as much of a surprise considering this official
stance on international pharmaceutical patent protection.
C. Argument that the Resolution was Fair
The official stance of both parties is that the resolution reached was
165 Mayne, supra note 5, at 146.
166 Id.
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fair and beneficial to both parties. Brazil's Health Minister, Jose Saraive
Felipe stated that the resolution precluded any need to break Kaletra's
patent and that
"[t]he price we reached is what the national AIDS program
17 1
could pay."

Even if coercion was used, Article 8 of the TRIPS Agreement may
justify the actions of both Abbott and the U.S. government in reaching the
resolution. Article 8 provides that Member States may "adopt measures
necessary to protect ...and promote the public interest." 172 One could
assert that protecting the financial success of a major pharmaceutical
company existing in a capitalist market is well within the public interest.
The caveat to this grant of discretionary power is that measures used be
consistent with the TRIPS Agreement.17 3 The question then becomes
whether threatening to remove Brazil from inclusion under the U.S.
Generalized System of Preferences is a tactic consistent with the principles
of the TRIPS Agreement and the specific provisions found therein.
D. Larger Effects of the Resolution: A Failure to Establish an Important
Precedent
1. Background
Brazil is classified by the United Nations as an "upper-middle income
country."' 174 While Brazil's economy may pale in comparison to that of the
United States, it is still far stronger than those of the world's poorest
countries. In addition, Brazil has managed to curb the growth of the AIDS
epidemic within its borders through the adoption of government
programs. 175 The issue at stake in this dispute had international
implications, as other countries with domestic pharmaceutical
manufacturing capacity might be tempted to infringe the Kaletra patent if
Brazil led the way.17 The success of Brazil's efforts to gain access to
patented HIV and AIDS medications, such as Kaletra, "may be
interconnected with the potential options of poorer countries.'
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Other countries are much poorer and have a much larger AIDS
epidemic to worry about.' 7 9 Developing countries account for 95 percent of
the HIV/AIDS patients, with sub-Saharan Africa claiming 70 percent of the
total epidemic. 80 To put those percentages in perspective, the virus is
currently estimated to infect thirty-four million people globally.' 8' This
area, not coincidentally, contains a large number of the poorest nations in
the world. 82 Sub-Saharan African governments generally spend less than
$10 per person annually on health care; combine that sum with the per
capita income of less than $50 a month and it becomes clear that a
government program or individually financed system of treatment is
presently impossible in these countries. 83 According to the World Health
Organization, only 10,000 of the twenty-five million estimated African
AIDS victims were receiving antiretroviral treatment as of 2001 .
The TRIPS Agreement, even if effective, may not provide relief to
developing countries. While Brazil and other middle income countries have
the production capacity to manufacture and distribute drugs domestically,
poorer countries lack the economic means necessary to do so.'8 5 Without
the ability to produce and distribute generic versions of licensed drugs
within their own borders, a compulsory license awarded under the TRIPS
Agreement is useless to these countries. The poorest countries, those most
in need of the help that the TRIPS Agreement was designed to provide, are
left with an incomplete solution-the right to manufacture drugs that they
have no capability to actually produce.
2. Compulsory Licensing

Brazil would have been the first country in the world to break an
antiretroviral patent.' 86 If Brazil had been successful in declaring AIDS a
"national emergency" it would have certainly provided an opportunity to
interpret, clarify, and apply the compulsory licensing provision in the
TRIPS Agreement. Compulsory licensing is a potentially powerful tool for
poorer countries with large AIDS-infected populations who often find
themselves on the short end of the bargaining stick with wealthier countries
and their patent holders. Establishing a precedent for the use of the
compulsory licensing exception under the TRIPS Agreement would pave
the way for developing countries to achieve affordable access to cutting179
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edge, high priced pharmaceuticals that are currently under patent
protection. 187 Major patent holders, like Abbott Laboratories, have heavily
opposed efforts by developing countries to utilize the compulsory licensing
exception for fear of the precedent that would be 88
established, namely one of
avoiding the protection of their valuable patents.'
One might argue that the existence of the compulsory licensing
provision mandates its use. Specifically, that compulsory licensing is
expressly provided for under the TRIPS Agreement and should, therefore,
be used instead of trying to reach a negotiated settlement with the patentee
outside of the TRIPS Agreement framework. The question then becomes
whether the Brazil/Abbott Labs dispute would have been an appropriate
situation to attempt the use of the compulsory licensing provision of the
TRIPS Agreement. By negotiating a settlement, Brazil avoided the risk of
failing to qualify for a compulsory license under a formal proceeding under
the TRIPS Agreement. Furthermore, if Brazil had tried and failed to
qualify for a compulsory license, other countries would be less able to use
the threat of a compulsory license as a tool to achieve a lower negotiated
price for drugs. Since no precedent has been established on the ease of
gaining a compulsory license, it remains a powerful negotiating tool for
developing nations-pharmaceutical companies might choose to lower
prices rather than risk losing in a compulsory license dispute.
3. Export Under the Waiver ofArticle 3169
Had the compulsory license been approved by the WTO, Brazil would
have the production capacity to exceed its own need, and under the current
waiver of Article 3 1(f) may have been able to export generic versions of
Kaletra to other poorer countries in even greater need.9 Not only would
export of generic medications in excess of the domestic needs benefit
poorer countries lacking production capacity, but it would also boost the
economy of the exporter-producer.1 90
Pharmaceutical manufacturers understandably fear the slippery slope
potentially created under Article 31 (f) waivers. The argument is that the
application of this waiver could create an entire "parallel international
market" for generic versions of their valuable patented merchandise, thus
substantially reducing profits. 191 Perhaps this is what Abbott feared most.
The pharmaceutical manufacturer's fear of Article 31(f) waivers may
potentially cause them to more vigorously oppose grants of compulsory
187 See Lazzarini, supra note 1, at 125.
188Id.
189 See id. at 134.
190 See id.
191See id.
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licenses, thus reducing the overall effectiveness of Article 31 for countries
in need.
4. IndirectAid: Affecting the Market

It is possible that in reaching its deal with Abbott, Brazil failed to
"share the wealth," so to speak. Studies have shown that the presence of
generic drugs in the market results in lower pharmaceuticals prices
overall. 192 If Brazil had not reached a negotiated agreement with Abbott,
and instead manufactured a generic version of Kaletra (through a
compulsory license, or by violating the TRIPS Agreement), Brazil may
have been able to indirectly help other poorer countries purchase Kaletra at
a lower price.
Scholars have also concluded that compulsory licensing of new patents
will advance a nation's technological growth.' 9 Similarly, compulsory
licensing under the TRIPS Agreement may lead to domestic technological
advances in pharmaceutical development.
In theory, access to
pharmaceutical patents would allow for developing countries to catch up, so
to speak, to their wealthier patent-holding counterparts. Technological
parity would lead to economic competition, and ultimately lower prices on
pharmaceuticals.
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent controversy between Brazil and Abbott Laboratories over
the patent to Kaletra brings to light one of the more controversial issues
surrounding the TRIPS Agreement, compulsory licensing of AIDS
medications. Unfortunately, the resolution of the Kaletra controversy left
the larger dispute unresolved. Developing countries will have to wait for
another opportunity to establish a much needed precedent defining the
AIDS epidemic as a "national emergency" under Article 31(b). 194 Until
then, pharmaceutical companies holding antiretroviral patents will likely
continue to fight application of the TRIPS Agreement exceptions in hopes
that compulsory licensing will never be realized.

192 See id. at 108.

193See Kripapuri, supra note 22, at 692.
194 TRIPS, supra note 6, art. 3 1(b).

Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business

27:199 (2006)

